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Abstract 
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relationship both between board ownership and takeover profitability, and 
between board ownership and post-takeover share returns. We cast the 
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specification. The results are therefore consistent with a managerial 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between board ownership in 
acquiring companies and the long run financial performance of 
UK domestic takeovers. Takeovers are a field of research that 
has generated a large and controversial literature on both sides 
of the Atlantic (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Hughes, 1993). One 
of the conundrums that this literature has produced is an 
apparent divergence between the impact of takeovers when 
measured using accounting data and when measured using stock 
market prices. On balance the evidence is not consistent with 
takeovers producing profitability improvements. This is 
inconsistent with the stock market studies, which report 
combined positive shareholder gains over the takeover 
announcement period (Caves, 1989). However, a number of 
event studies have reported negative abnormal stock returns 
following the completion of takeovers, which suggest that 
abnormal returns during the announcement period may 
overestimate future profit gains from takeover (Agrawal and 
Jaffe, 1999). This is consistent with the studies using accounting 
returns.  
 
The neutral results for accounting performance and the long run 
negative share returns have led to a search for explanations for 
takeovers, which might be consistent with non-profit 
maximizing motives. Many acquiring companies are not run by 
the people who own them. When managers hold little equity in 
the firm and shareholders are too dispersed to enforce value 
maximization, corporate assets may be deployed to benefit 
managers rather than shareholders. Such managerial benefits can 
include pursuit of such non-value maximizing objectives as 
empire building and diversification through takeovers. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), as management 
ownership rises, managers bear a larger share of these costs and 
are hence less likely to squander shareholder wealth through 
managerial takeovers. In addition, it has been argued that where 
countervailing shareholder power to discipline managers exists 
     
in the form of off board institutional shareholdings, takeovers 
may be more value creating than when such power is absent 
(Cosh, Hughes and Singh, 1989: Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh, 
1998). Fama and Jensen (1983) have pointed out that in the 
absence of other offsetting board holdings, management which 
owns a substantial fraction of the firm’s equity may have 
enough voting power or influence to avoid the discipline of 
takeover
i. With effective control, the entrenchment hypothesis 
predicts that even with substantial ownership of cash flow 
rights, managers have incentives to take actions that benefit 
themselves in other ways at the expense of other shareholders. 
For example, when managerial shareholdings consist of large 
undiversified positions, managers may favour lower risk 
projects even if they are negative net present value 
opportunities. In addition, because of their ownership position, 




Board share ownership may therefore lead to performance 
which is either consistent or inconsistent with shareholder 
welfare maximizing behavior. Empirical studies for both the 
U.S. and U.K. have in fact found evidence of a non-monotonic 
relation between board ownership and company performance in 
general. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find that the value 
of Tobin's Q  at first increases with board share ownership, 
decreases and then increases again, whilst McConnell and 
Servaes (1991), and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), find an 
inverted U-shaped relationship.  For the U.K., Short and Keasey 
(1998) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999), find evidence broadly 
consistent with Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Their 
interpretation of these results is that once the conditions 
necessary for entrenchment are reached, further ownership 
bestows no further entrenchment. The convergence-of-interests 
effect, in contrast, operates throughout the whole range of 
ownership. Therefore once entrenchment is reached, further 
ownership will result in an increase in company performance. 
 
     
As regards the impact of managerial ownership on takeover 
performance, previous studies have focused exclusively on the 
announcement period share returns of the merging firms. Taken 
as a whole, these studies suggest that bidder
iii share returns 
increase linearly with board shareholdings (Lewellen et al. 1985; 
Loderer and Martin, 1997; Shinn, 1999). These studies therefore 
suggest that the detrimental effects of entrenched management 
observed with company performance in general do not apply in 
the case of corporate takeovers, although one study (Hubbard 
and Palia, 1997) does document evidence of a U-shaped 
relationship. Hubbard and Palia (1997) argue that at sufficiently 
high levels of managerial ownership, managers hold a large non-
diversified financial portfolio in the firm. Such management will 
pay a premium for risk reducing acquisitions, even if the value 
of the acquiring firm decreases. 
 
A limitation of the takeover event studies is the assumption that 
capital markets are sufficiently informationally efficient for 
announcement effects to accurately reflect long run effects. 
However, managerially motivated takeovers stand out as being 
more likely to result in misvaluation of takeover performance by 
the stock market at the time of announcement. Because of the 
relatively low value creation in managerial takeovers, bidder 
management may be motivated to present an overly optimistic 
forecast to stock market analysts. If so, and if the market cannot 
identify such bidders, their takeovers may be overvalued at 
announcement. Hence, one explanation for the discrepancy 
between the short run results of the event studies and the results 
of accounting studies may be managerial takeovers. Despite the 
importance of the discrepancy, as Caves (1989) points out, 
“there has been little effort to assess it or to relate it to 
hypotheses about the sources of efficiency or inefficiency in 
mergers”
iv. In this paper we attempt to do this, by making a 
systematic analysis of board ownership in the acquiring firm 
with the long run profit and share return effects of takeovers. It 
is this examination of both accounting and share price 
methodologies over the long run, which primarily distinguishes 
     
our study from previous studies examining the impact of board 
ownership on takeover performance. 
Another important methodological issue, which we address, is 
the direction of causality between ownership and performance. 
While Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
treat ownership structure as exogenous, Kole (1996) and Cho 
(1998) find evidence of a reversal of causality in the ownership 
– corporate value relation, suggesting that corporate value could 
be a determinant of ownership structure rather than vice versa. 
Loderer and Martin (1997) test the endogeneity of board 
ownership and bidder announcement returns. They find that the 
significant linear relation disappears in a simultaneous equations 
framework, and instead find a significantly positive effect of 
takeover performance on board ownership. The possibility here 
is that boards of acquiring companies purchase stock in 
anticipation of good takeover performance. Seyhun (1990) 
provides evidence of this, showing that boards buy more stock 
during the announcement period in relatively profitable 
takeovers. 
 
We study the long run post-takeover performance of a sample of 
U.K. takeovers, which occurred between 1985-1995. Consistent 
with prior studies, sample takeovers have a neutral impact on 
profitability and a negative impact on long run share returns. 
This pattern is consistent with non-value maximizing motives 
for takeover. We find evidence of a non-linear relationship 
between board ownership and takeover profitability. At low 
levels of bidder board ownership, takeovers do not improve 
profitability and have a significantly negative impact on long 
run share returns. Bidders with higher levels of ownership carry 
out profitable takeovers. However, beyond a certain level of 
ownership, takeover profitability and long run share returns are 
significantly negative. Since it is not clear whether board 
ownership determines takeover performance or vice versa, we 
cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework using 
non-linear two-stage least squares. However, we find that the 
results are robust to this alternative specification. Overall, we 
     
consider this evidence to support the view that board ownership 
provides managerial alignment with shareholders at low levels 
but results in managerial entrenchment at high levels. We 
investigate the characteristics of takeovers carried out by 
entrenched bidders and find that such takeovers involve 
relatively large targets, and result in a significant decline in 
profit margins and investment. 
 
Section 2 describes the data and the methodology. Section 3 
examines the relation between the post-takeover performance of 
takeovers and the management ownership of the bidder. Section 
4 concludes.   
 




We examine a sample of 142 takeovers of U.K. public 
companies by U.K. public companies, completed between 
January 1985 and December 1995, with the end date chosen to 
enable us to examine 4 years of post-takeover performance. The 
sample is drawn from Guest (1999), which consists of a 
comprehensive sample of 140 hostile takeover bids matched by 
industry and year with 140 friendly takeover bids. A takeover is 
defined as occurring when the bidder owns less than 50% of the 
target shares before the takeover bid, and increases its 
ownership to at least 50% as a result of the bid. Consistent with 
previous studies, the sample excludes takeovers involving 
financial and property companies because they are subject to 
special accounting requirements, making them difficult to 
compare with other companies. To obtain a representative 
sample of takeovers for the purposes of this study, we delete 
hostile takeovers randomly from the original Guest sample until 
the proportions of hostile and friendly takeovers reflect the true 
population of all takeovers over the time period considered.  
 
     
Information on managerial shareholdings was collected from the 
Hambro Company Guide. This database contains information on 
the ownership structure of the vast majority of UK listed stocks, 
and was available for each acquiring sample company, resulting 
in a final sample of 142 takeovers
v. This is to be compared with 
the total of 740 U.K. takeovers by U.K. companies from 1985-
95. 
 
Certain characteristics of the final sample are shown in Table 1. 
Panel A shows that the sample of takeovers is more heavily 
concentrated in the 1980s than the 1990s, which is consistent 
with the overall pattern of takeover activity over these time 
periods (Guest, 1999). Panel B shows the size distribution of 
sample firms, relative to all firms listed on the U.K. stock 
market. Targets are distributed evenly across the different size 
deciles, whilst bidders are relatively large, with over 50% being 
concentrated in the largest two size deciles. This size 
distribution is very similar to that reported by Gregory (1997) 
for 1984-92, and suggests that our sample is representative of 
the overall population of takeovers. Panel D reports the size of 
targets relative to bidders prior to the takeover. The mean ratio 
is 0.28, indicating that our sample of takeovers represent 
significant investments for the bidders involved.  
 
     
2.2. Methodology  
 
2.2.1. Accounting study methodology 
 
For the accounting study we examine the pre- and post-takeover 
profitability of bidders and targets, relative to control firms 
matched on industry and size. Barber and Lyon (1996) show that 
profitability can be determined by industry, or firm specific 
factors such as size. Sample firm profitability is therefore 
measured relative to control firms matched on size and industry, 
based on the methodology suggested by Barber and Lyon 
(1996)
vi. The control firms are selected from firms listed on 
Datastream, which neither made, nor received a takeover offer 
for a public company during 1985-95.  
 
The numerator of our profitability measure consists of operating 
profit plus other income and extraordinary items before interest 
paid and taxation. Other income is included to capture profits 
from joint ventures, which, if excluded, could cause an upward 
bias when what was previously associate income is consolidated 
in post-takeover operating profit. Extraordinary items are added 
to profits because in the U.K. over this period, acquirers could 
exclude integration costs from profit by classifying them as 
extraordinary items. The denominator of our profitability 
measure is the average of beginning- and ending-period book 
value of assets. Assets are defined as the book value of ordinary 
shareholders funds, long and short term borrowing, and 
preference stock. U.S. studies (see, e.g., Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback, 1992) employ the market rather than book value of 
assets as the denominator because the presence of goodwill and 
positive write-ups to fair values is likely to bias downwards 
accounting return on book asset measures.  However, unlike 
their U.S. counterparts, over the time period of this study U.K. 
companies did not have to carry goodwill in the balance sheet 
and amortise it against income. Instead, they were able to 
immediately write off the goodwill against equity reserves in the 
balance sheet and so avoid diluting reported earnings with 
goodwill amortisation. This gives a result which, save for the 
     
restatement of acquired assets at fair values, is substantially the 
same as pooling accounting. Consequently, U.K. companies 
have almost invariably chosen the write-off option, and unlike 
the U.S., write-ups to fair values have very infrequently been 
positive in the U.K. (Higson, 1998). Therefore, the downward 
bias observed in the U.S. does not appear to exist in the U.K. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that investors appear to lower 
their assessment of takeovers in the post-takeover period, 
causing a reduction in the market value of assets. Healy, Palepu 
and Ruback (1992) show that under these circumstances, using a 
market value denominator could lead to an increase in 
profitability post-merger, even if profits are held constant.  
 
We focus our analysis on the three years before the takeover 
(years – 3 to – 1) and three years following the takeover (years 1 
to 3)
vii. We exclude year 0, the year of the takeover, from the 
analysis because in this year the two firms are consolidated for 
financial reporting purposes only from the takeover completion 
date
viii. We truncate the distributions of firm profitability where 
it is more than two standard deviations outside the mean, to 
ensure that the results are not driven by a few large outliers.  
 
2.2.2. Event study methodology 
 
For the event study, we calculate buy and hold share returns for 
the announcement period and the post-takeover period relative 
to control firms matched on size and market-to-book value 
(MTBV), based on the methodology suggested by Barber and 
Lyon (1997)
ix. The underlying parameter of interest in this study 
is the long-run performance of sample firms, and we therefore 
employ buy and hold returns rather than cumulative average 
returns (see e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997). The cross sectional 
long-run returns of securities are better explained by size and 
market-to-book value than beta (Fama and French, 1992). The 
market-to-book value of bidders and targets differ from other 
firms (Hughes, 1993). Panel C in Table 1 shows the distribution 
of market-to-book ratios of bidders and targets, relative to all 
     
firms listed on the U.K. stock market. Bidders tend to have 
medium to high market-to-book values, with 75% concentrated 
in the largest six deciles. Alternatively, targets have medium 
market-to-book values. We adopt the control firm approach 
because it avoids the skewness and rebalancing biases inherent 
in a reference portfolio approach, although it is nevertheless 
susceptible to the new listing bias described by Barber and Lyon 
(1997). We employ the natural logarithm of the buy and hold 
return to ensure that the share returns conform as closely as 
possible to a normal distribution. 
 
2.3. Board share ownership  
 
In this work we measure total executive and non-executive 
director shareholdings at the last accounting year-end prior to 
takeover. Table 2 reports summary descriptives on the board 
ownership and compensation of sample acquirers. The first 
column reports the percentage of ordinary shares owned either 
beneficially or non-beneficially by the board of the acquirer 
excluding options
x. The mean combined stake of all board 
members is 8.9%. The median stake, however, is only 2.2%, 
suggesting that the distribution is skewed, which is confirmed 
by the skewness measure. Indeed, in 57 firms (40% of the 
sample), board holdings totalled to no more than 1% of 
outstanding equity, and in 40 of our firms (28% of the sample), 
total board members owned no more than 0.2% of the firm. 
Nonetheless, in 35% of our sample the board owned more than 
5% of the firm, in 25% of the sample the board owned more 
than 10%, whilst in 15% the board owned more than 20%. The 
board ownership level in acquirers is very similar to that 
reported for previous U.K. studies, suggesting that our sample of 
bidders is representative. For example, Sudarsanam et al. (1996) 
report a mean ownership of 10%, for the period 1980-1990. 
However, these board ownership levels for bidders are notably 
lower than those for U.K. companies in general. Short and 
Keasey (1999) report average (median) levels of 12.5% (5.6%) 
between 1988 and 1992, whilst Faccio and Lester (1999) report 
     
average (median) levels of 16.74% (7.95%) between 1996 and 
1997. Additionally, the board ownership levels are much lower 
than those reported for US acquirers by Loderer and Martin, 
(1997), who report a mean of 14.6% and median of 9.0%.  
 
Because the takeovers sampled span over one decade, the 
sterling amounts of the indicated items cannot of course be 
readily compared across the various events. Nonetheless, some 
sense of the general orders of magnitude of shareholding and 
compensation may be useful in establishing the context of the 
analysis. The median remuneration of the board of the acquirer, 
in the year preceding the takeover is £529,500. The median 
values of shares directly owned (excluding options) amount to 
£1,793,600
xi. The mean share ownership values are much larger, 
owing to the presence in the sample of several very sizeable 
board holdings (five of which are in excess of £100 million). 
Therefore, the median shareholding values are some three and a 
half times the magnitude of median remuneration. Cosh and 
Hughes (1989, 1997) show that this represents a massive rise in 
the importance of management stock ownership since the early 
1980s, but these figures are substantially smaller than those 
reported for the US (Loderer and Martin, 1997). It appears quite 
possible that despite the increase in share ownership, an increase 
in remuneration due to increased firm size via takeover, may 
outweigh any loss in the value of shares as found by several 
studies (Lambert et al. 1987).  
 
Table 2 also shows the importance of stock options for the 
boards of acquiring companies. Options have become 
increasingly important in the UK over the time period of our 
study, and play a similar incentive role to shares. For the 119 
companies for which we have information on board options, 
their median value is almost half the median value of shares held 
for the 142 sample companies. However, options total less than 
one fifth of ordinary shares when we consider their mean values. 
 
     
As noted above, external shareholdings can play a potentially 
important role in constraining boards where agency problems 
exist. External shareholders are measured as those which own 
above 5% before 1989, and above 3% after 1989. For our 
sample of bidders, Table 2 shows that the median value of the 
largest external shareholding is 6.48%, compared to 2.2% for 
board ownership, indicating the importance of external 
shareholdings. We also report statistics on the sum of large 
external shareholders. The median value is 6.89%. This suggests 
that for the median sample company, the largest external 
shareholder is the only large external shareholder.  
 
The correlation coefficients for the measures of board 
ownership, remuneration, external shareholdings, and company 
size are presented in Panel B of Table 2. The most consistent 
result to emerge from Panel B is the strong positive correlation 
between firm size and the value of board shares, options and 
remuneration. There is also a significantly negative correlation 
between the % holdings of shares and options with firm size. 
This suggests the need to control for firm size when examining 
the impact of board % holdings on takeover performance. 
However, we note that the % of ordinary board holdings is 
significantly positively correlated with the market value of these 
holdings, possibly suggesting that the % measure also accurately 
represents the incentive effects faced by bidder boards. 
 
3. Board ownership and takeover performance  
 
In this section, we evaluate the relation between board 
ownership and the impact of takeovers on performance. In 
Section 3.1 we consider the takeover performance of our sample 
firms as a whole in terms of both profitability and share returns. 
In section 3.2 we consider the relation between board ownership 
and takeover profitability, and in Section 3.3 we examine the 
relation between board ownership and takeover share price 
performance.  
 
     
3.1 Takeover performance of sample firms 
 
To examine the profit effects of takeover, we aggregate 
performance data of the bidder and target firms before the 
takeover to obtain the pro forma pre-takeover performance of 
the combined firms. Comparing the post-takeover performance 
of the bidder with this pre-takeover benchmark provides a 
measure of the change in performance. To control for size and 
industry, we calculate adjusted profit returns, which are 
differences between values for the combined firms and values 
for the weighted-average control firms. In the pre-takeover 
period the weights for the control firms are the relative asset size 
of bidders and targets estimated at the beginning of each year, 
whilst in the post-takeover period the weights of control firms 
are the relative asset sizes of bidders and targets in year –1, 
since target size is unavailable after takeover. The proper post-
takeover benchmark must take account of any above average 
high or low pre-takeover performance, otherwise some of the 
difference between pre- and post-takeover performance could be 
due to mean reversions in profitability (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 
1987; Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh, 1998). We adopt the 
methodology employed by Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), 
where the effect of takeover is measured as the intercept of a 
cross sectional regression of post-takeover adjusted profit 
returns on the corresponding pre-takeover adjusted returns as 
follows: 
 
PROFPOST  =   +   PROFPRE +       (1)  
      
 
where PROFPOST  is the median annual adjusted profit return 
on assets for the combined firm from the three post-takeover 
years and PROFPRE is the pre-takeover three year median for 
the same combined firm. Our measure of the effect of takeover 
on profit returns is the intercept  from Eq. (1). The slope 
coefficient   captures any systematic relationship in profit 
returns between the pre and post-takeover years so that   
     
PROFPRE  measures the effect of the pre-takeover performance 
on post-takeover returns. The intercept is therefore independent 
of pre-takeover returns.  
 
Table 3 reports the results from Eq. (1) for the sample of 
takeovers. The estimate of  is 0.32, indicating that adjusted pre-
takeover profit returns tend to persist over time, but with 
substantial regression to the mean. The constant   is 2.01%, 
which is insignificantly different from zero.  This indicates that 
there is not a significant improvement in the merged firms 
profitability in the post-takeover period
xii. This finding is 
consistent with the majority of U.S. and U.K. studies for earlier 
time periods (Caves, 1989; Hughes, 1993).   
 
To estimate the impact of the sample takeovers on share returns, 
we estimate buy and hold share returns over the announcement 
period and the four year period following the completion date, 
for both sample firms and size- and market-to-book control 
firms. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the mean announcement 
abnormal return earned by targets in takeovers is 24.63%, which 
is statistically significant at the one per cent level. The mean 
abnormal bidder return is 0.67% over the announcement period, 
which is statistically insignificant. To investigate whether the 
total gains to both bidder and target shareholders are positive, 
we examine the combined adjusted returns which are the 
weighted average adjusted returns for both bidder and target, 
with the weights being the relative market values at the start of 
the period. The combined announcement returns are a 
significantly positive 5.84%. The markets assessment of 
takeovers at announcement appears inconsistent with the neutral 
impact on profitability over three years.  
 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that over the four-year period 
following the completion date, the mean abnormal return earned 
by bidders is –29.27%, which is statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level. Panel C of Table 4 reports the buy and hold 
returns over both the announcement and post-takeover periods 
     
to establish the overall returns to shareholders. Bidder 
shareholders experience abnormal returns of –28.4%, significant 
at the 1% level. The combined adjusted return over both time 
periods consists of the weighted average of the target 
announcement returns and the bidder overall returns. This is –
13.13%, which is statistically significant, indicating that the 
negative post-takeover share returns significantly outweigh the 
positive announcement returns.  
 
One possible explanation for the negative share returns is that 
the stock market reacts negatively to new information regarding 
the profitability of the takeover which only comes to light in the 
post-takeover period. To investigate this, we consider whether 
the post-takeover adjusted share returns are correlated with the 
profit effects of takeover, by estimating Eq. (1) including the 
post-takeover adjusted share returns as an independent variable. 
The coefficient for this variable is 0.04, and statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
In summary, the evidence presented in this section indicates that 
takeovers create significant value for target shareholders at 
announcement, whilst bidder shareholders neither gain nor lose. 
These announcement returns are inconsistent with the neutral 
profit effects of takeover. Over the long run post-takeover 
period, takeovers result in significantly negative returns. The 
evidence is consistent with takeovers being carried out for 
nonvalue maximizing motives (Jensen, 1986), and of bidder 
management presenting an overoptimistic picture of future 
prospects to the stock market at the time of the takeover, which 




     
3.2 Board ownership and takeover profit performance 
 
3.21  Board ownership and takeover profitability: Single 
equation analysis 
 
In this section we consider the relation between board ownership 
and takeover profitability. As a preliminary step, we examine 
takeover profitability for different levels of board shareholding. 
The results are shown in Table 5. Profitability is measured as the 
difference between the actual post-takeover profitability, and the 
expected post-takeover profitability, which is the pre-takeover 
level multiplied by 0.323, the value of  from Eq. (1). Hence our 
expected profit makes adjustment for regression to the mean in 
profitability. The data reveal two distinct break points, which 
occur at 3.5% and 19%. When board holdings are below 3.5% 
(LOW), takeover has a small insignificant impact on profits, 
whereas when board holdings are in between 3.5% and 19% 
(MEDIUM), takeover has a large positive statistically 
significant impact. However, when board holdings are greater 
than 19% (HIGH), takeover has a significantly negative impact 
on profitability. However, at very high levels of shareholding, 
performance starts to improve. The t-test for differences 
between LOW and MEDIUM, and between MEDIUM and 
HIGH are all statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
To examine the precise nature of the relation between board 
ownership and takeover profitability, we experiment with 
different econometric specifications. Whereas the alignment of 
interests hypothesis predicts that larger stakes should be 
associated with better takeover performance, the prediction of 
the entrenchment hypothesis is much less clear-cut, suggesting 
that company performance can be adversely affected for some 
range of high ownership stakes. Since theory provides relatively 
little guidance as to what this relationship should be, we follow 
the approach of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) of using the 
specification that best fits the data. Specifically, we estimate a 
cubic polynomial regression. In previous drafts of this paper, we 
     
used dummy variables and piecewise coefficients. However, the 
results with the cubic polynomial are stronger in the sense of 
having lower R
2, suggesting that the data prefer this particular 
parameterisation.  
 
The regressions we run are the following: 
 
PROFDIFF = f (PROFPRE, BDSH, BDSH 
2, BDSH 
3)   (2)
      
 
PROFDIFF = f (PROFPRE, BDSH, BDSH 
2, BDSH 
3, 
LARGE, MOOD, PAYMENT, HORIZ, MTBV, SIZE, 
  INDUSTRY)           (3)
         
 
 
Where PROFDIFF is the difference between the post- and pre-
takeover adjusted profitability, and PROFPRE is as defined 
above. BDSH is the board shareholding. In Eq. (3), we introduce 
additional independent variables into the regression to determine 
whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of other factors 
that have been advanced as both important determinants of 
takeover performance, and associated with board ownership. 
This analysis addresses the concern that any correlation between 
takeover performance and board ownership is a spurious result 
of a correlation between these two variables and a third omitted 
variable (Himmelberg et al. 1999). LARGE  is defined as the 
fraction of stock owned by non-board shareholders with more 
than 3% ownership in the company in the year preceding the 
takeover
xiii. It is argued that large concentration of shares 
amongst outside owners facilitates the monitoring of the non-
value maximizing actions of managers, decreasing the 
likelihood that management will carry out takeovers which 
decrease firm value (Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh, 1989). 
MOOD is a dummy variable which equals one if the takeover is 
hostile and zero if friendly. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) 
argue that managerial takeovers are more likely to be friendly, 
     
and consistent with this, Guest (1999) shows that hostile 
takeovers have a significantly positive impact on profitability 
whilst friendly takeovers have a neutral impact.  PAYMENT is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the method of payment 
includes a 100% cash alternative, zero otherwise. Martin (1996) 
shows that acquirers with relatively high ownership levels are 
significantly more likely to use cash as their method of payment, 
whereas low and extremely high ownership acquirers are more 
likely to use equity. Since cash bids have generally been shown 
in the literature to be associated with good takeover performance 
(Loughran and Vijh, 1997) the significantly positive impact of 
medium ownership may not hold once we control for the 
method of payment. Amihud and Lev (1981) show that 
diversifying takeovers are more likely when managerial 
shareholdings are high, whilst Morck et al. (1990) show that 
such takeovers are value destructive. We therefore include a 
dummy variable, HORIZ, which equals one if the bidder and 
target are in the same two digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC), and zero otherwise. Rau and Vermaelen 
(1997) show that MTBV has a significantly negative effect on 
takeover performance, whilst Cho (1998) shows that MTBV has 
a significantly positive effect on board ownership. We therefore 
include MTBV as a control variable. The use of percentage 
measures to measure incentive effects is problematic when firms 
differ in size, since a small percentage holding in a large firm 
may still be large enough in monetary terms to have huge 
incentive effects. We therefore include SIZE, which measures 
the natural logarithm of the market valuation of the acquirer at 
the end of the financial year prior to takeover. Previous studies 
have shown that there are important industry effects in terms of 
both board ownership and takeover performance.  We therefore 
include a dummy variable INDUSTRY, that equals one for each 
2 digit SIC of the acquiring company, zero otherwise, if there 
are more than two sample takeovers within that particular 
industrial classification. 
 
     
The coefficients on board ownership and takeover performance 
are shown in Table 6 and are presented graphically in Figure 2. 
The coefficient for board ownership is a significantly positive 
1.19, the coefficient for board ownership squared is a 
significantly negative –7.60. The coefficient for the cube of 
board ownership is a significantly positive 7.68. These 
coefficients suggest that for each 1% increase in ownership 
between 0% and 5%, the effect of takeover on profit rises by an 
average 1%. This suggests that at low levels of ownership, there 
is a noticeable reduction in agency costs resulting from 
increasing board ownership. For each increase in ownership 
from 5% to 10%, takeover performance increases but at a slower 
rate. For each 1% increase in ownership from 10% to 25%, 
takeover performance declines by 0.5%. This suggests that the 
takeover impact of bidders with 20% ownership is 
approximately equal to that of bidders with less than 1% 
ownership. As ownership rises beyond 20% we detect further 
declines in takeover performance. This deterioration reaches a 
minimum at 50% ownership at which point takeover 
performance starts to improve. However, it is only at very high 
levels of ownership (65%) that takeovers once again have a 
positive impact on profitability.  
 
The results
xiv are consistent with the studies of general company 
performance such as Morck et al. (1988) and Faccio and Lasfer 
(1999). However, they are not consistent with the majority of 
event studies which suggest a linear relation between board 
ownership and bidder announcement share returns. One way to 
interpret our results is that of Morck et al. (1988), who suggest 
that the initial rise in takeover performance as ownership rises 
might reflect managers greater incentives to maximize value as 
their stakes rise. Beyond the 10% ownership level, however, 
increases in managerial ownership may be associated with 
conditions conducive to the entrenchment of incumbent 
management. Throughout this range, the incentive effect can 
still be operative; it is just dominated by the entrenchment 
effect. As board ownership reaches the neighbourhood of 50%, 
     
managements with even higher board ownership might not be 
significantly more entrenched than those with 50% ownership. 
The increase in takeover performance at the very highest 
ownership levels then might reflect a pure convergence of 
interests effect.  
 
As regards the control variables, LARGE has an insignificantly 
positive effect suggesting that the presence of large external 
shareholders in the acquiring company is not associated with 
significantly better takeover performance. This is inconsistent 
with the evidence of Cosh et al. (1989) for an earlier time period 
in the U.K. The MOOD coefficient is positive although 
statistically insignificant, as is the PAYMENT coefficient. 
HORIZ has no significant effect on takeover performance. This 
is to be contrasted with previous studies such as Morck et al. 
(1990), who find a negative effect of diversifying takeovers. 
MTBV has a significantly positive effect on takeover 
profitability. This is consistent with the results of Lang et al. 
(1990), but inconsistent with the evidence of Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998). SIZE has an insignificantly positive effect.  
 
3.22  Board ownership and takeover profitability: 
Simultaneous equations analysis 
 
In this section, we explore the possibility that causation runs not 
only from board shareholding to performance but also in the 
opposite direction. Whilst Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) treat ownership structure as exogenous, Kole 
(1996) and Cho (1998) find evidence of a reversal of causality in 
the ownership – corporate value relation, suggesting that 
corporate value could be a determinant of ownership structure 
rather than vice versa. In the context of this study, the possibility 
exists that at low levels of ownership, boards purchase stock in 
anticipation of good takeover performance, whilst the negative 
relation at higher levels of ownership may be the result of 
greater ownership being necessary to justify and push through 
deals the market disapproves of (Loderer and Martin, 1997). 
     
Loderer and Martin (1997) use OLS to find a significant linear 
relation between board ownership and bidder announcement 
returns. However, this relation disappears once reverse causality 
is taken into account using a system of simultaneous equations, 
and the authors instead find a significantly positive linear effect 
of takeover performance on board ownership. However, it is not 
just board shareholdings which may be determined by takeover 
performance. Off board shareholdings may also be determined 
by expected takeover performance. For example, institutional 
investors may select firms which are expected to carry out profit 
increasing takeovers. Similarly, if the stock market can 
anticipate in advance which firms are likely to carry out 
profitable takeovers, high MTBV may be associated profitable 
takeovers.  
 
Therefore, previous studies suggest that ownership structure and 
takeover performance may be endogenously determined. If this 
were true, the coefficient estimates in Table 6 could be biased 
and inconsistent, and subject to an identification problem. To 
address the potential endogeneity effect, we estimate a 
simultaneous equations system of ownership structure, MTBV, 
large off board shareholdings and takeover performance using 
the non-linear two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. The non-
linear 2SLS methodology is appropriate when the endogenous 
variables are nonlinearly related, as in our model where board 
ownership is a non-linear determinant of takeover performance. 
The nonlinear estimation technique is discussed in Greene 
(1997). Specifically, we estimate the following simultaneous 
equations system: 
 
PROFDIFF = f (PROFPRE, BDSH, LARGE, MOOD, 
PAYMENT, HORIZ, MTBV, SIZE, INDUSTRY    (4) 
 
MTBV = f (PROFDIFF, BDSH, LARGE, SIZE, INDUSTRY, 
I N V E S T )             ( 5 )  
 
     
BDSH = f (PROFDIFF, LARGE, MTBV, SIZE, INDUSTRY, 
LIQUID,  SALESBOOK)        (6) 
 
LARGE = f (PROFDIFF, BDSH, MTBV, SIZE, INDUSTRY, 
STDEV,  VAR)           (7) 
 
The 2SLS systems are estimated by first obtaining the first stage 
estimates of the endogenous variables, PROFDIFF, MTBV, 
BDSH and LARGE. This is done by including all the exogenous 
variables, their squared and cubed values, and their cross 
products as instruments (Kelejian, 1971; Chen and Steiner, 
1999). The estimates of the endogenous variables are then used 
directly as independent variables to obtain the second stage 
estimates, in equations 4-7.  
 
The justification and definition of the new variables in 
Equations 4-7 is as follows:  
 
INVEST is the rate of capital expenditure to total assets for 
the bidder. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that investment 
has a positive effect on corporate value, and evidence for this is 
found by McConnell and Muscarella (1985). 
 
LIQUID measures the current assets to current liabilities ratio of 
the acquirer in the year prior to takeover. As suggested by 
Jensen (1986), the higher is a firm’s free cash flow, all else 
being equal, the higher is the desired level of managerial 
ownership. Consistent with prior studies, we use liquidity as a 
proxy for free cash flow, which is itself unobservable (Schwert, 
2000).  
 
SALESBOOK measures the sales to total assets ratio of the 
acquirer in the year prior to takeover. To the extent that 
investments in fixed capital are observable and more easily 
monitored, firms with a greater concentration of fixed or “hard” 
capital in their inputs will generally have a lower optimal level 
of managerial ownership (Himmelberg et al. 1999). Following 
     
Himmelberg et al. (1999) we use the firms sales to book ratio as 
a measure of the relative importance of hard capital in the firm’s 
technology. 
 
STDEV and VAR measure the standard deviation and variance 
of the bidder’s stock over the 36 months prior to the 
announcement month, relative to the FTSE 500. These two 
variables have been proposed by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) as 
proxies for “control potential”. The rationale they offer is as 
follows: Stock price volatility makes it more difficult for 
atomistic shareholders to monitor managers’ decisions. 
Unmonitored managers indulge in self serving behavior, which 
depresses stock prices. But lower stock prices create incentives 
for outsiders to assemble blocks of shares, enforce shareholder 
friendly decisions, and capture a share of the associated stock 
price revaluation. Thus the greater the stock price volatility, the 
larger the holdings of outside monitors. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) contend that this relation is concave. If this is so, STDEV 
should have a positive coefficient and VAR a negative one
xv. 
 
The results are reported in Table 7. The first column reports the 
effect of the different variables on takeover profitability. The 
board ownership coefficients are of very similar magnitude in 
the 2SLS analysis to those in the single equation analysis. Each 
coefficient is of similar magnitude and is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. These results suggest that the cubic polynomial 
relation between board ownership and takeover performance is 
the result of ownership affecting performance rather than vice 
versa. As in the single equation analysis, the coefficient for 
LARGE is positive but statistically insignificant, confirming that 
off board holdings are not a significant determinant of takeover 
performance.  Once again, the coefficients for PAYMENT and 
MTBV are significantly positive. Therefore, the positive relation 
between MTBV and takeover performance does not appear to be 
the result of high valuations being attached to firms that are 
likely to carry out profitable takeovers. We carry out the 
Hausman specification test to determine whether OLS or 2SLS 
     
is the correct specification for takeover performance. This test 
rejects the hypothesis that there is no simultaneity at the five per 
cent level (chi square -4.24). 
 
The second column reports the results of Eq. (5). In this case, 
the board ownership coefficients are of different signs and are 
not statistically significant. We conclude that there is no 
significant impact of board ownership on MTBV in a 
simultaneous equations framework, consistent with Loderer and 
Martin (1997), and Cho (1998). There is also no evidence that 
off board holdings have a significant impact on MTBV. The 
coefficient for SIZE is positive and statistically significant. It 
appears that board ownership is more important in determining 
the performance of takeovers than in determining firm 
performance in general. 
 
The third column in Table 7 reports the results of Eq. (6). We 
find no evidence that takeover performance has a significant 
effect on board ownership. The effect of takeover performance 
on board ownership is insignificantly negative. Since it is 
possible that there are different effects depending on the level of 
board ownership, we carry out this regression for different 
ranges of ownership. However, we still we find no evidence of a 
significant effect of takeover performance on board ownership. 
Similarly, the effect of MTBV on board ownership is 
insignificant, a result that also holds across different board 
ownership ranges. We find a significantly negative effect of off 
board ownership (LARGE) on board ownership, suggesting a 
substitutability effect. The coefficient for SIZE is significantly 
negative, suggesting that board ownership is lower as the size of 
the company increases.   
 
The fourth column in Table 7 reports the results of Eq. (7). We 
find no evidence that either takeover profitability or MTBV 
have a significant effect on off board holdings. However, we 
find strong evidence that off board holdings are determined by 
board shareholdings. The coefficient for BDSH is significantly 
     
negative. There is therefore strong evidence of a two-way 
relationship between board holdings and off board holdings. 
Finally, off board shareholdings are significantly smaller in 
larger acquirers. 
 
The results strongly suggest that the relation between board 
ownership and takeover performance is the result of board 
shareholdings leading to takeover performance rather than vice 
versa. We find strong evidence that board ownership effects 
takeover performance, and no evidence that takeover 
performance affects board ownership. We now consider whether 
the stock market anticipates the non-linear relation during the 
announcement period of the takeover, and if not whether, it is 
reflected in long run post-takeover share returns. 
 
 
3.3 Board ownership and post-takeover share price 
performance 
 
This section considers the effect of board ownership on the 
shareholder wealth of the bidder and target firms. As in section 
3.1, we estimate buy and hold share returns over the 
announcement period and the four year period following the 
completion date, for both sample firms and size- and market-to-
book control firms.  
 
Table 8 reports the abnormal share returns for the different 
bands of shareholding. Considering first the announcement 
returns, there is little evidence that board ownership has a 
significant impact on target returns. Target abnormal returns are 
large and positive for most shareholding levels. For the three 
subsamples, low, medium, and high, there are no significant 
differences. A similar picture emerges in terms of bidder returns. 
There is some evidence that bidder returns are higher for the 
medium subsample. However, the t-tests for the differences 
between the low, medium and high categories are not 
significant. Similarly, the combined announcement returns are 
     
positive and statistically significant for each type of bidder. 
There is no evidence from the announcement share returns of 
bidders and targets of a non-linear relation between takeover 
performance and board ownership. The market’s assessment of 
takeovers carried out by bidders with board holdings in the 3.5 
to 19% ranges appears consistent with the subsequent 
improvement in profitability. However, the positive 
announcement period share returns in low and high board 
takeovers appear at odds with the subsequent profit effects 
reported above.  
 
We examine the post-takeover share returns to see whether the 
share returns are more consistent with the profit effects when 
measured over the long run. Table 8 shows that over the four-
year period following the completion date, the mean adjusted 
return earned by acquirers with low ownership stakes is –
33.673%, which is statistically significant at the 1%  level. 
Similarly, acquirers whose boards own more than 19% 
experience significantly negative post-takeover share returns of 
– 76.070%. In contrast, the mean adjusted return earned by 
acquirers with ownership stakes less than 19% but greater than 
3.5% is an insignificantly positive 13%.   The difference 
between medium and low board acquirers is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, as is the difference between medium 
and high bidders. The overall returns to bidders and the overall 
returns to the combined companies are very similar to the post-
takeover returns.  
 
To examine in more detail the relation between board ownership 
and share returns, we estimate equations very similar in 
specification to those in section 3.2. In particular, we estimate 
the following two equations: 
 
SRETURN = f (BDSH, BDSH 
2, BDSH 
3)       (8) 
 
 
     
SRETURN = f (BDSH, BDSH 
2, BDSH 
3, LARGE, MOOD, 
PAYMENT, HORIZ, MTBV, SIZE, INDUSTRY)     (9) 
 
Where SRETURN is the abnormal share return for the specified 
time period.  
 
Table 9 reports the results of this regression for the bidder, 
target and combined firm for the various time periods. We find 
no evidence of a significant cubic relation between board 
ownership and announcement returns for bidders, targets or 
combined returns. We experimented with a variety of linear and 
non-linear specifications for announcement returns but found no 
significant relation. We did find a linear relation between 
combined returns and board ownership, however the coefficient 
is only significant at 13%. Our study thus differs from previous 
U.S. event studies but is consistent with that of Firth (1980) in 
finding an insignificant positive linear relation for the 
announcement period.  
 
Table 9 also reports the results of Eqs (8) and (9) for the post-
takeover returns. A very different picture emerges from these 
regression. There is now strong evidence of a cubic polynomial 
relationship between share returns and board ownership. The 
coefficients for BDSH, BDSH
2, BDSH
3 are all statistically 
significant at the 5% level. We find almost identical results 
when the dependent variable is the overall bidder or overall 
combined firm returns, and hence do not report these 
regressions. We therefore find strong evidence of a relation 
between share returns and board ownership, but this evidence is 
only evident over the long run. It appears that the impact of low 
and high ownership bidders is only recognized over the long run 
following the takeover.  
 
Once again, as with profitability, we test for reverse causality 
between the long run share returns and board ownership. In 
order to do this we carry out simultaneous equations analysis for 
     
the post-takeover share returns using very similar equations to 
those in Section 3.22. The regressions are the following; 
 
SRETURN = f (BDSH, LARGE, MOOD, PAYMENT, HORIZ, 
MTBV,  SIZE,  INDUSTRY)          (10) 
 
MTBV = f (BDSH, LARGE, SIZE, INDUSTRY, INVEST)  (11) 
 
BDSH = f (SRETURN, LARGE, MTBV, SIZE, INDUSTRY, 
LIQUID, SALESBOOK)                   (12) 
 
LARGE = f (SRETURN, BDSH, MTBV, SIZE, INDUSTRY, 
STDEV, VAR)                       (13) 
 
The results for Eq. (10) in Table 10 show that the only 
significant coefficients in post-takeover returns are BDSH
2 and 
BDSH
3. BDSH is of a similar magnitude but is now only 
significant at the 15% level. We find almost identical results in 
terms of bidder overall returns and combined overall returns and 
hence do not report these regressions. The results of Eq. (12) 
show no evidence that the post-takeover share returns are a 
significant determinant of board ownership. The results would 
appear to confirm that it is higher board ownership which 
determines long run share returns rather than vice versa. From 
Eq. (11) we find that once again, in a simultaneous equations 
framework, board ownership does not have a significant effect 
on MTBV. This finding is consistent with previous studies 
(Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998).   
 
In summary, the evidence indicates that regardless of the size of 
board shareholding, takeovers create significant value for target 
shareholders at announcement whilst bidder shareholders neither 
gain nor lose. There is no evidence of a non-linear relation 
between board ownership and share returns over the 
announcement period, as observed for takeover profitability. 
Therefore the significantly positive announcement returns in low 
and high ownership takeovers appear somewhat at odds with the 
     
subsequent profit effects. However, there is strong evidence of a 
cubic polynomial relation between long run post-takeover 
abnormal share returns and board ownership. The takeovers 
carried out by bidders with low and high board ownership result 
in significantly negative long run returns whilst takeovers 
carried out by bidders with medium board ownership do not. 
This long run share return evidence is very consistent with the 
profit effects which suggests nonvalue maximising motives for 
takeover (Jensen, 1986) at low and high levels of board 
ownership, which are only recognised over the long term post-
takeover period by the stock market. The evidence suggests that 
low and high ownership acquirers do not improve performance 
through takeover, but that the stock market does not recognise 
this during the announcement period.     
 
3.4   What are the characteristics of takeovers carried out by 
entrenched bidders? 
 
The most robust result of the analysis thus far is the decline in 
takeover performance brought about by board ownership levels 
exceeding 10%. We have seen that at board levels greater than 
19%, takeovers experience significantly negative post-takeover 
profit and share returns, despite experiencing significantly high 
announcement share returns. In this section, we examine how 
this subsample of takeovers carried out by entrenched bidders 
differs from the other takeovers in terms of both pre- and post-
takeover characteristics. The objective is to try and establish 
why entrenched boards carry out takeovers that destroy 
shareholder wealth, and in particular whether they benefit 
themselves from such takeovers. 
 
3.41   The pre-bid characteristics of entrenched takeovers  
 
Table 11 reports the pre-takeover characteristics of acquiring 
and acquired companies, and transaction characteristics for the 
takeovers involving entrenched and non-entrenched bidders. In 
Section 1, we suggested why entrenched boards may take 
     
actions that benefit themselves at the expense of other 
shareholders. Perhaps the most relevant of these motives in the 
context of takeovers is risk diversification. For example, when 
managerial shareholdings consist of large undiversified 
positions, managers may favour takeovers which reduce firm 
specific risk even if they are negative net present value 
opportunities. The proportion of horizontal takeovers carried out 
by non-entrenched bidders is 0.31, whilst the proportion carried 
out by entrenched bidders is 0.39
xvi. This finding contrasts with 
that of Amihud and Lev (1981) who find that as managers own 
more equity, they will be more likely to diversify due to their 
greater need for risk reduction. An alternative measure of 
diversification is the covariance of equity returns between the 
bidding and target firms. We calculate the 66 month covariance 
prior to 6 months before the announcement month. Table 11 
shows that the average covariance for entrenched takeovers is 
0.36 whilst that for non-entrenched takeovers is 0.28, whilst the 
difference between the two variables is not statistically 
significant. This finding contrasts with that of May (1995), who 
finds that CEO shareholding is significantly positively 
correlated with the covariance of bidder and target pre-takeover 
share returns. We conclude that there is little evidence that 
takeovers carried out by entrenched boards are motivated by the 
desire to reduce risk. 
 
We find that entrenched bidders are significantly smaller than 
non-entrenched bidders. The average non-entrenched bidder is 
in the 8
th largest stock market size decile, whilst the average 
entrenched bidder is in the 6
th largest decile. The size of targets 
is very similar for both entrenched and non-entrenched bidders, 
being on average in the 5
th largest size decile. Therefore 
entrenched bidders are taking over companies which are very 
close in size to themselves, whereas non-entrenched bidders take 
over targets which are significantly smaller than they are. We 
find that the relative size of targets is 1.1 for entrenched bidders, 
and 0.28 for non-entrenched bidders. The difference between the 
two samples is statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore 
     
the takeovers carried out by entrenched boards are much more 
important takeovers for the bidder than those carried out by non-
entrenched boards
xvii. The evidence suggests that entrenched 
boards are more ambitious in the mergers they attempt.  
 
Entrenched bidders are less likely than non-entrenched bidders 
to make cash bids, however the difference is not statistically 
significant. Similarly, there is no difference in the proportion of 
hostile bids made by entrenched and non-entrenched bidders. 
The average value of board holdings for entrenched bidders is 
£100m, which is significantly greater than that for non-
entrenched bidders. We find no evidence that entrenched boards 
pay themselves more than non-entrenched boards, consistent 
with the evidence of Holderness and Sheehan (1989) and Denis 
and Denis (1994). We find that neither the proportion nor the 
value of board options are higher for entrenched bidders than 
non-entrenched bidders. We also investigate whether other 
target characteristics such as profitability, growth and leverage 
differ between entrenched and non-entrenched takeovers. 
However (results not reported), we find no evidence to suggest 
that this is the case.  
 
3.42  The post-bid characteristics of entrenched takeovers  
 
We investigate the post-takeover operating and investment 
characteristics of entrenched bidders, in an attempt to shed light 
on the nature of their underperformance. The results are reported 
in Table 12. The operating profit return can be decomposed into 
the profit margin and asset turnover. The effect of entrenched 
takeovers on the profit margin is significantly negative, whilst 
the effect on asset turnover is negative but statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that the reason for the deterioration 
in profit is an increase in costs per unit of sales rather than a 
decrease in sales. This is reinforced by the sales growth results 
which show no significant deterioration for entrenched bidders. 
Leverage significantly increases for both entrenched and non-
entrenched bidders and the difference between the two is not 
     
statistically significant. We find a significant reduction in capital 
expenditures by entrenched bidders. This reduction is 
significantly lower than that experienced by non-entrenched 
bidders. Consistent with this, we find that asset growth declines 
significantly in entrenched takeovers but not in non-entrenched 
takeovers. However, the difference between the two types of 
takeover is not statistically significant.  
 
In a further test of the diversification hypothesis, we compare 
the variance of the combined firms stock returns after the 
takeover with the variance of the bidders stock return prior to 
takeover. We do this with and without controlling for general 
stock market movements. However we find that in both 
entrenched and non-entrenched takeovers, variance actually 
increases rather than decreases following takeover.   
 
Summing up, we find no evidence that entrenched bidders carry 
out takeovers for risk diversification motives. We find that 
entrenched bidders are significantly smaller than non-entrenched 
bidders, yet takeover targets are of similar size for both types of 
bidder. Consequently, the relative size of targets is significantly 
larger for entrenched bidders. The nature of the 
underperformance is relatively clear; entrenched takeovers result 
in a significant reduction in capital expenditures, and a 
significant deterioration in profit margins. We conclude that 
although there is strong evidence that entrenched bidder 
shareholders lose out in takeovers, it is by no means obvious 
from the above evidence that entrenched management 
expropriate shareholder wealth at the benefit of themselves.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the impact of board share ownership in the 
acquiring company on takeover performance. Evidence comes 
from a sample of 142 takeovers between U.K. public industrial 
firms completed in the period 1985 to 1995. We find that these 
takeovers have a neutral impact on profitability, a result which is 
     
consistent with the previous literature for both the U.K. and the 
U.S. Despite the impact on profitability, these takeovers result in 
significant overall wealth gains during the announcement 
period. However, this initial wealth gain is offset by the post-
takeover negative share returns experienced by the bidder.  
 
We find strong evidence of a cubic polynomial relation between 
board ownership and long run takeover performance. At board 
ownership levels around zero, takeover results in a neutral profit 
impact and significantly negative long run share returns. As 
board ownership rises from 0% to 10%, the performance of 
takeovers increases, indicating that managers’ interests are 
converging with those of shareholders. Once levels of ownership 
of 10% are reached, further ownership has a negative impact on 
takeover performance, indicating that managerial entrenchment 
starts to take place. Takeovers carried out by boards with 
ownership levels between 3.5% and 19% result in significant 
increases in profitability. However, takeovers carried out by 
acquirers whose boards hold more than 19% of equity result in a 
significant decline in profits, and significantly negative post-
takeover share returns. Takeover performance declines until 
board ownership is as high as 50%, at which point it starts to 
improve again.  
 
Other studies have shown that the relation between board 
ownership and company performance could go in either 
direction. However, we find strong evidence that ownership 
effects takeover performance and not vice versa. Using non-
linear two stage least regression techniques, we find that our 
results are robust. The findings on long run takeover 
performance are thus to be contrasted with those for Tobin’s Q, 
which as this and other studies have demonstrated, do not hold 
in a simultaneous equations framework.  
 
We find no evidence that entrenched bidders carry out takeovers 
for risk diversification motives. We find that entrenched bidders 
are significantly smaller than non-entrenched bidders, yet 
     
takeover targets are of similar size for both types of bidder. 
Consequently, the relative size of targets is significantly larger 
for entrenched bidders. Compared to non-entrenched bidders, 
entrenched takeovers result in a significant deterioration in 
profit margins and a significant reduction in capital 
expenditures.  
 
Our results suggest that takeovers carried out by boards with a 
small or very large stake in the firm may be a manifestation of 
managerial failure, and should be viewed with some degree of 
scepticism by shareholders. Such scepticism was not evident for 
the takeovers examined here, since announcement returns were 
significantly positive on average. In hindsight, these 
announcement returns appear overoptimistic, a conclusion 
reinforced by the significantly negative share returns which 
followed. It appears that the discrepancy between the accounting 
and event studies of takeover is closely linked to managerial 
board ownership, consistent with the argument that managerial 
takeovers are more likely to be overvalued at announcement by 
the stock market. 
     
Notes 
 
1     For example, Weston (1979) finds that no firm in which 
insiders control more than 30% of the shares has ever been 
acquired through a hostile takeover. 
 
2   Holderness and Sheehan (1989) cite examples such as 
excessive compensation, consumption of perquisites, 
borrowing from the firm at below market interest rates, 
and paying differential dividends.  
 
3   There is also evidence that as acquiring board holdings 
increase, a lower premium is paid for the target (Slutsky 
and Caves, 1991), and that overall gains to both bidder and 
target are higher (You et al., 1986).  
 
4     A related argument is that of Rau and Vermaelen (1998), 
who provide evidence that the negative post-takeover 
share returns are the result of hubris (as measured by book-
to-market value) on the part of bidders.  
 
5      The Hambro Guide does not provide information on board 
share options. We were able to gather information on 
options for 119 of the 142 acquirers using company 
accounts and the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register. 
 
6     To select the control firms, we firstly match each sample 
firm to all non-merging firms in the same Datastream 
industrial classification (equivalent to a two-digit SIC 
code). To match on size, we select the potential control 
firm with the book value of assets closest to sample firms’ 
asset size in the year prior to takeover. 
 
7      The results are qualitatively unchanged when we extend the 
analysis to 4 years. 
     
8              This occurs under the acquisition accounting method, 
which nearly all bidders used over the time period of our 
study (Higson, 1998). 
 
9             To select the control firms we firstly divided all U.K. 
stocks listed on Datastream into 50 equal sized portfolios 
based on their market values at the beginning of each 
calendar year. We then match each sample firm with the 
firm from its size portfolio which has the closest market-
to-book value. This procedure is repeated for each 
calendar year pre- and post-takeover.  
 
10         For most boards, the number of non-beneficial shares 
owned was very small compared to beneficial holdings. 
The most common reason for non-beneficial holdings was 
family holdings. Even if the board members do not 
exercise direct voting power of such shares, it would seem 
likely that they would be voted as they suggested, and so 
we attribute them to the board. 
 
11   We estimate the value of board shares (and options) by 
multiplying their number by the bidder share price at the 
end of the last accounting year prior to takeover. 
 
12         We conduct specification tests for Eq. (1)  to assess 
whether the residuals are homoskedastic. We cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the residuals are homoskedastic at the 
1% level. 
 
13      5% prior to 1989. 
 
14      We conduct further tests to determine the robustness of our 
results. We also re-estimate our results using various 
different measures of profitability, such as trading profit to 
book, and trading profit to sales. The results are materially 
unchanged. These results suggest that the relation between 
takeover performance and board ownership is not a 
     
spurious result of the way in which performance is 
measured.  We also carry out the analysis including share 
options as well as board ownership. The results for the 
reduced sample of 119 companies are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
 
15     We carried out separate analysis using pre-takeover profit 
of the bidder and target separately, excluding PROFPRE, 
and treating the pre-takeover profit of the bidder as 
endogenous. The results are qualitatively unchanged.  
 
16    We check this result using Datastream Industry 
classifications rather than SIC. The results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
 
17   However, the entrenched takeovers are not particularly 
important for the bidder’s industry. The horizontal 
entrenched takeovers account for 9.3% (median 3.7%) of 
industry output, measured by total market value of public 
companies in the DS industry. 



















FIGURES AND TABLES 
     
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for sample takeovers completed between January 
1985 and December 1995  
 
Panel A reports the distribution by year of sample takeovers made by U.K. public 
firms for U.K. public firms. The takeovers are those in which the bidder and target are 
covered by the Datastream database. Panel B reports the distribution of size decile 
rankings of bidder and targets. Size deciles are computed at the end of the calendar 
year prior to the year of announcement for all U.K. listed firms. Decile 1 is the 
smallest. Panel C reports the distribution of market-to-book decile rankings, where 
market-to-book deciles are similarly computed at the end of year prior to the 
announcement year for all U.K. listed firms. Panel D reports the sizes of targets 
relative to bidders at the end of the month prior to the month of announcement. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of takeover years 
Years  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total
Number    17 24 21 21 11  6  18  3  5  7  9 142 
Percent  of  total  12.0 16.9 14.8 14.8  7.7 4.2  12.7  2.1 3.5 4.9 6.3  100.0
              
Panel B: Size deciles of bidder and target prior to the year of takeover 
 
Size decile    Bidders  Targets 
1-2 smallest    8 (5.63%)  17 (11.97%) 
3-4    11 (7.75%)  33 (23.24%) 
5-6    14 (9.86%)  31 (21.83%) 
7-8    35 (24.65%)  31 (21.83%) 
9-10    74 (52.11%)  30 (21.13%) 





 1631.57  (473.67)  295.74  (69.56) 




 Bidders  Targets 
1-2 smallest    11 (7.75%)  22 (15.49%) 
3-4    21 (14.79%)  26 (18.31%) 
5-6    32 (22.54%)  32 (22.54%) 
7-8    43 (30.28%)  44 (30.99%) 
9-10    35 (24.65%)  18 (12.68%) 
Total   142  142 
Average (median)    2.675 (1.735)  1.790 (2.505) 
Panel D: Sizes of targets relative to bidders prior to the announcement month of the 
takeover  
 
Mean   0.284   
Maximum   5.902   
Minimum   0.001   
Median   0.186   
a The market capitalization values of the targets are in millions of sterling, deflated using the FTSE All 
Share Index with 1998 as the base year. 
     
Table 2 Descriptive statistics on board ownership, compensation and 
external ownership of acquiring sample companies  
 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for measures of board share ownership, 
remuneration, options, and external shareholdings for the 142 sample companies. The 
data on option holdings refers to a smaller subsample of 119 companies. Panel B 
reports the correlation coefficients between these measures. 
 

















































Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Median 2.02  1793.
6 
529.5 3.4  0.64 1161.
6 
6.89 6.48  144412 
Mean 8.86  1479
1.3 
835.6 22.5  1.01  2404.
0 
11.73 7.59  616594 






14.34 9.05  1402505 
Minimum 0.00  0.0  29.0  0.0  0.00  0.0  0.00  0.00  301.0 






77.80 60.00 11745046 
Skewness 2.40  5.4  6.4  5.1 3.09 7.4 1.81 2.22  4.9 
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients 
Market value of shares 
(£000) 
0.20 
b           
Board pay (£000)  -0.16 
c  0.25 
a            
Market value of shares / 
board pay 
0.52 
a  0.59 
a  -0.06           
Options as % of ordinary 
capital 
0.13 -0.04  -0.21 
b 
0.23 
b        
Market value of options 
(£000) 
-0.08 0.37 
a  0.79 
a  0.20 
b  0.02        
Sum of external holdings 
(%) 
0.02 -0.02  -0.12  0.01  0.18 
b  -0.12     
Largest external holding 
(%) 
0.02 0.01 -0.08  0.01 0.12 -0.09  0.90 
a    
Size of company (£000)  -0.19 
b  0.27 
a  0.88 
a  -0.03 -0.26 
a  0.74 
a  -0.22 
a 
-0.19 
b   
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, 
using a two tailed test 
     
Table 3 The post-takeover profit returns of sample takeovers  
 
This table reports the effect of the takeover on adjusted profit returns, computed with 
reference to non-merging industry- and size-matched control firms. Profit is measured 
as operating profit plus other income and extraordinary items, divided by the average 
of beginning- and ending-period book value of assets. Pre-takeover returns for the 
combined firm are weighted averages of bidder and target returns, with the weights 
being the relative asset values of the two firms. PROFPOST is the median adjusted 
profit for the three-year post-takeover period, PROFPRE is the median adjusted profit 
for the three-year pre-takeover period. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
 
PROFPOST      =       2.01%         +      0.323 PROFPRE
 




2 = 0.0824 F-statistic = 13.66 
a   N = 142 
 
a Significantly different from zero at the 1% level , using a two tailed test 
     
Table 4 The announcement and post-takeover share returns of sample takeovers  
 
This table reports the mean of the natural logarithm of buy and hold share returns for 
bidders, targets and control firms for the announcement and post-takeover periods. 
The announcement period lasts from the beginning of the announcement month to the 
end of the month of completion. The post-takeover period lasts from the end of the 
month of completion to 4 years afterwards. The abnormal share returns are computed 
with reference to control firms matched on size and market-to-book value. The 
combined abnormal return is the weighted average return of the bidder and target 
abnormal returns, with the weights being the relative market values of the two firms. 
Parametric significance levels for tests in difference in means are based on the t-test 
(t-statistics are in parentheses).  
 
    Sample firms  Control firms    Abnormal returns 
Panel A: Announcement period 













Panel B: Post-takeover period 




Panel C: Announcement and post-takeover period 









a, c Significantly different from zero at the 1% and 10% levels respectively, using 
a two tailed test 
     
Table 5 The relation between board ownership in the acquiring firm and 
takeover profitability 
 
This table shows the mean effect of takeover on profitability in different bands of board 
shareholdings. The figures are the difference in post- and pre-takeover adjusted profit returns, 
after adjusting for expected regression to the mean in profitability as described in the text. 
Profit returns are adjusted, with reference to non-merging industry- and size-matched control 
firms. Profit is measured as operating profit plus other income and extraordinary items, 
divided by the average of beginning- and ending-period book value of assets. Pre-takeover 
returns for the combined firm are weighted averages of bidder and target returns, with the 




No  Difference between post- and pre-bid profitability 
0  to 1  55  1.245  
1 to 5  35  4.020  
5 to 10  15  4.755  
10 to 15  7  13.625  
15 to 20  9  9.516  
20 to 25  5  -6.181  
25 to 30  4  -7.901  
30 to 35  2  3.224 
35 to 40  0  - 
40 to 45  2  -17.084 
45 to 50  1  -38.075 
50 to 55  3  -8.714 
55 to 60  0  - 
60 to 65  1  -2.646 
65 to 70  3  -3.822 
LOW (0 to 3.5)  86  2.106 (1.438) 
MEDIUM (3.5 to 19)  33  8.540 
b (3.204) 
HIGH (19 to 70)  23  -7.390 
b (3.634) 
LOW vs. MEDIUM  119  -6.433 
b (3.050) 
LOW vs. HIGH  109  9.500 
a (3.351) 
HIGH vs. MEDIUM   56  -15.930 
a (4.893) 
a, b  Significantly different from zero at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, using a 
two tailed t-test 
     
Table 6 The relation between board ownership in the acquiring firm and 
takeover profitability: Single equation analysis 
 
Ordinary least squares regression analysis of profitability difference due to takeover, on board 
ownership, external ownership, and other firm and transaction characteristics. The adjusted profit 
returns are computed with reference to non-merging industry- and size-matched control firms. Profit is 
measured as operating profit plus other income and extraordinary items, divided by the average of 
beginning- and ending-period book value of assets. Pre-takeover returns for the combined firm are 
weighted averages of bidder and target returns, with the weights being the relative asset values of the 
two firms. The dependent variable in each regression is PROFDIFF, the difference between the median 
adjusted profit for the three-year post-takeover period, and the median adjusted profit for the three-year 
pre-takeover period (PROFPRE). BDSH is the percentage of shares held by the board of the acquirer. 
LARGE is the percentage of shares held by off board large shareholders. MOOD is a dummy variable 
which equals one if the takeover is hostile, zero if friendly. PAYMENT is a dummy variable, which 
equals one if the method of payment includes a 100% cash alternative. HORIZ is a dummy variable, 
which equals one if the takeover is horizontal, defined as being in the same 2-digit SIC. MTBV is the 
market-to-book value of the bidder at the last accounting year prior to takeover. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of market valuation of the bidder at the last accounting year prior to takeover. Where 





































LARGE   0.141 
(1.038) 
MOOD   0.071 
(1.459) 
PAYMENT   0.056 
(1.576) 
HORIZ   0.038 
(0.966) 
MTBV  0.010 
c 
(1.877) 
SIZE   -0.005 
(-0.418) 
INDUSTRY   No  Yes 
Adjusted R
2 0.2567  0.2860 
F-statistic 13.82  2.71 
p-value (0.0000) (0.0001) 
N 142  142 
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, 
using a two tailed test 
     
Figure 1  The relation between board ownership in the acquiring firm and 
takeover profitability 
 
This figure shows the relation between takeover profitability (PROFDIFF) and board 

























































































     
Table 7  Simultaneous equation analysis of takeover profitability, MTBV, board 
ownership and external ownership, using the non linear two stage least squares 
method  
 
PROFDIFF is the difference between the median adjusted profit for the three-year 
post-takeover period, and the median adjusted profit for the three-year pre-takeover 
period (PROFPRE). BDSH is the percentage of shares held by the board of the 
acquirer. LARGE is the percentage of shares held by off board large shareholders. 
MOOD is a dummy variable which equals one if the takeover is hostile, zero if 
friendly. PAYMENT is a dummy variable which equals one if the method of payment 
includes a 100% cash alternative. HORIZ is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
takeover is horizontal, defined as being in the same 2-digit SIC. MTBV is the market-
to-book value of the bidder at the last accounting year prior to takeover. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of market valuation of the bidder at the last accounting year prior to 
takeover. INVEST is the rate of capital expenditure to total assets for the bidder. 
LIQUID is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities for the bidder. 
SALESBOOK is the bidders sales to total asset ratio. STDEV and VAR measure the 
standard deviation and variance of the bidders stock over the 36 months prior to the 
announcement month, relative to the FTSE 500. Where indicated, a dummy variable 
(INDUSTRY) is included for each 2 digit SIC industry. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
 DEPENDENT  VARIABLE 
 PROFDIFF  MTBV



















































    
HORIZ 0.058 
(1.413) 

































   -0.014 
(-1.382) 
 
STDEV       -0.020 
(-1.457) 
VAR 
     0.001 
b 
     
(2.135) 
INDUSTRY   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
F-statistic 2.73  1.28  3.10 1.88 
p-value (0.0001)  (0.1822)  (0.0000)  (0.0104) 
Adjusted R
2 0.3177  0.0667  0.2734  0.1038 
N 142  142  142  142 
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, 
using a two tailed test 
     
Table 8  The relation between board ownership in the acquiring firm and 
takeover share returns  
 
This table reports the mean of the abnormal buy and hold share returns for bidders, 
targets and combined firm for the announcement and post-takeover periods. The 
announcement period lasts from the beginning of the announcement month to the end 
of the month of completion. The post-takeover period lasts from the end of the month 
of completion to 4 years afterwards. The adjusted share returns are computed with 
reference to control firms matched on size and market-to-book value. The combined 
adjusted return is the weighted average return of the bidder and target adjusted 
returns, with the weights being the relative market values of the two firms. Standard 
















    AG  AD AGAD AG  AG AGAD 
0  to 1  55  -0.578   25.551   3.498 
  -33.327 
  -33.904  -22.525 
1 to 5  35  1.324   29.507   8.017   -16.663   -15.339  -7.231 
5 to 10  15  5.247   16.653   6.759   -4.423   0.824  8.624 
10 to 15  7  -8.064   29.500  1.042   -56.355   -64.419  -32.212 
15 to 20  9  4.683   7.600  9.538   42.035   46.718  36.964 
20 to 25  5  -9.409   14.541   -6.245   -51.817   -50.862  -42.130 
25 to 30  4  9.147   27.477   12.992  -29.702   -20.556  -1.811 
30 to 35  2  -5.440   37.161  22.109   -330.213   -335.654  -62.981 
40 to 45  2  10.110   11.726  9.526   -102.017   -91.907  -54.059 
45 to 50  1  -23.669  11.024  -9.839  -157.781  -181.450  -104.720 
50 to 55  3  16.287  33.077   20.667  -124.207   -107.920  -47.186 
60  to  65  1  2.172  46.111 16.255 10.486 12.658 23.381 
65 to 70  3  -1.979  35.340   6.288  38.299   36.320  32.191 


































































































a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, 
using a two tailed t-test 
     
Table 9 The relation between board ownership in the acquiring firm and 
takeover share returns: single equation analysis 
 
Ordinary least squares regression analysis of takeover abnormal share returns, on board 
ownership, external ownership, and other firm and transaction characteristics. Abnormal 
mean buy and hold share returns are calculated for bidders and targets for the announcement 
and post-takeover periods. The announcement period lasts from the beginning of the 
announcement month to the end of the month of completion. The post-takeover period lasts 
from the end of the month of completion to 4 years afterwards. The adjusted share returns are 
computed with reference to control firms matched on size and market-to-book value. The 
combined adjusted return is the weighted average return of the bidder and target adjusted 
returns, with the weights being the relative market values of the two firms. BDSH is the 
percentage of shares held by the board of the acquirer. LARGE is the percentage of shares 
held by off board large shareholders. MOOD is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
takeover is hostile, zero if friendly. PAYMENT is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
method of payment includes a 100% cash alternative. HORIZ is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the takeover is horizontal, defined as being in the same 2-digit SIC. MTBV is 
the market-to-book value of the bidder at the last accounting year prior to takeover. SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of market valuation of the bidder at the last accounting year prior to 
takeover. Where indicated, a dummy variable (INDUSTRY) is included for each 2 digit SIC 





  Announcement period  
abnormal share returns 
 Post-takeover  period 
abnormal share returns 
  AG AG AD AD  AGAD 
 



















































































   -0.086 
(-0.110) 







   0.147 
(0.520) 






   0.236 
(1.140) 








   -0.067 
(-0.299) 






   0.008 
(0.271) 






   0.092 
(1.275) 
INDUSTRY   No   Yes  No   Yes  No   Yes    No   Yes 
Adjusted R 
2  -0.0162 -0.0633 0.0082 0.1014 -0.0010  -0.0481    0.0530  0.1287 
F-statistic  0.25 0.74 1.39 1.50 0.96  0.80    3.61  1.65 
p-value  (0.860) (0.837) (0.249) (0.065)  (0.416) (0.765)  (0.015)  (0.031) 
N  142 142 142 142 142  142    142  142 
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, 
using a two tailed test 
     
Table 10   Simultaneous equation analysis of post-takeover long run share 
returns, MTBV, board ownership and external ownership, using the non linear 
two stage least squares method  
 
SRETURN is the mean of the abnormal buy and hold share returns for bidders for the post-takeover 
period. The post-takeover period lasts from the end of the month of completion to 4 years afterwards. 
The abnormal share returns are computed with reference to control firms matched on size and market-
to-book value. LARGE is the percentage of shares held by off board large shareholders. MOOD is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the takeover is hostile, zero if friendly. PAYMENT is a dummy 
variable which equals one if the method of payment includes a 100% cash alternative. HORIZ is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the takeover is horizontal, defined as being in the same 2-digit 
SIC. MTBV is the market-to-book value of the bidder at the last accounting year prior to takeover. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of market valuation of the bidder at the last accounting year prior to 
takeover. INVEST is the rate of capital expenditure to total assets for the bidder. LIQUID is the ratio of 
current assets to current liabilities for the bidder. SALESBOOK is the bidders sales to total asset ratio. 
STDEV and VAR measure the standard deviation and variance of the bidders stock over the 36 months 
prior to the announcement month, relative to the FTSE 500. Where indicated, a dummy variable 
(INDUSTRY) is included for each 2 digit SIC industry. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
  DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
  SRETURN MTBV










































    
PAYMENT 0.144 
(0.490) 
    
HORIZ 0.211 
(0.979) 
































   -0.015 
(-1.448) 
 
STDEV       -0.022 
(-1.601) 
VAR 
     0.001 
b 
(2.308) 
INDUSTRY   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
F-statistic 1.50  1.16  2.98 1.84 
p-value (0.0646)  (0.2889)  (0.0000)  (0.0148) 
Adjusted R
2 0.1152  0.0165  0.2798  0.1172 
N 142  142  142  142 
 
     
a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively, using a two tailed test. 
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i For example, Weston (1979) finds that no firm in which insiders control more than 30% of the shares has ever 
been acquired through a hostile takeover. 
ii Holderness and Sheehan (1989) cite examples such as excessive compensation, consumption of perquisites, 
borrowing from the firm at below market interest rates, and paying differential dividends.  
iii There is also evidence that as acquiring board holdings increase, a lower premium is paid for the target 
(Slutsky and Caves, 1991), and that overall gains to both bidder and target are higher (You et al., 1986).  
iv A related argument is that of Rau and Vermaelen (1998), who provide evidence that the negative post-
takeover share returns are the result of hubris (as measured by book-to-market value) on the part of bidders.  
v The Hambro Guide does not provide information on board share options. We were able to gather information on 
options for 119 of the 142 acquirers using company accounts and the Price Waterhouse Corporate Register. 
vi To select the control firms, we firstly match each sample firm to all non-merging firms in the same 
Datastream industrial classification (equivalent to a two-digit SIC code). To match on size, we select the potential 
control firm with the book value of assets closest to sample firms’ asset size in the year prior to takeover. 
vii The results are qualitatively unchanged when we extend the analysis to 4 years. 
viii This occurs under the acquisition accounting method, which nearly all bidders used over the time period of 
our study (Higson, 1998). 
ix To select the control firms we firstly divided all U.K. stocks listed on Datastream into 50 equal sized 
portfolios based on their market values at the beginning of each calendar year. We then match each sample firm 
with the firm from its size portfolio which has the closest market-to-book value. This procedure is repeated for 
each calendar year pre- and post-takeover.  
x For most boards, the number of non-beneficial shares owned was very small compared to beneficial holdings. 
The most common reason for non-beneficial holdings was family holdings. Even if the board members do not 
exercise direct voting power of such shares, it would seem likely that they would be voted as they suggested, and 
so we attribute them to the board. 
xi We estimate the value of board shares (and options) by multiplying their number by the bidder share price at 
the end of the last accounting year prior to takeover. 
xii We conduct specification tests for Eq. (1)  to assess whether the residuals are homoskedastic. We cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the residuals are homoskedastic at the 1% level. 
xiii 5% prior to 1989. 
xiv We conduct further tests to determine the robustness of our results. We also re-estimate our results using 
various different measures of profitability, such as trading profit to book, and trading profit to sales. The results are 
materially unchanged. These results suggest that the relation between takeover performance and board ownership 
is not a spurious result of the way in which performance is measured.  We also carry out the analysis including 
share options as well as board ownership. The results for the reduced sample of 119 companies are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
xv We carried out separate analysis using pre-takeover profit of the bidder and target separately, excluding 
PROFPRE, and treating the pre-takeover profit of the bidder as endogenous. The results are qualitatively 
unchanged.  
xvi We check this result using Datastream Industry classifications rather than SIC. The results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
xvii However, the entrenched takeovers are not particularly important for the bidders industry. The horizontal 
entrenched takeovers account for 9.3% (median 3.7%) of industry output, measured by total market value of public 
companies in the DS industry. 